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Non-technical Summary 
 
While the benefits of patents for society as well as for patentees have extensively 
been studied in the theoretical and empirical economics of innovation literature, re-
searchers in recent years have more and more concentrated on potential negative 
effects of patents. These negative effects can arise if the estimated costs of the 
patent system to an innovator exceed the estimated benefits (Bessen and Meurer 
2008). This can for example be the case if the costs of defending a patent right ex-
ceed the profits of owning it.  If there is a negative impact of patent litigation for 
patentees or inadvertent infringers an ex-post tax is imposed on the innovative ef-
fort which results in an ex-ante reduction of innovation incentives (Bessen Meurer 
2008). 
Against this background the contribution at hand considers the costs and benefits of 
patents by analyzing how patent litigation affects the firm value of the disputing 
firms.  
Making use of the fact that patents involved in patent infringement litigation consti-
tute highly valuable intangible assets I expect decisions about the infringement of 
these highly valuable patents to be reflected in the value of the firms involved in 
litigation. 
 
This paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to model, in a stylized way, 
the impact of patent litigation and its outcome on the firm value of the plaintiff and 
the defendant, taking into account the particularities of the German patent litigation 
system. The second objective is to empirically test the hypotheses derived from this 
stylized model by using changes in credit rating for German firms as a proxy for 
changes in firm value.  
 
I find evidence that patent litigation is indeed reflected by changes in the firm value 
of plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants are negatively affected by a loss in trial or a 
settlement deal, while a victory leaves their firm value unchanged. I further show 
that small and inexperienced defendants are at a disadvantage compared to larger 
and more experienced firms, indicating that they are affected more severely by busi-
ness disruption and financial distress. By contrast I find a positive treatment effect 
of litigation on the plaintiffs, independent of the outcome of the case. The results 
match theoretical considerations on the functioning of the bifurcated patent litiga-
tion system in Germany: The temporal separation of decisions on patent infringe-
ment claims and corresponding patent invalidity (counter) claims provides a strate-
gic advantage to the plaintiff. The delayed decision of invalidity counterclaims (tem-
porarily) shifts a 
large share of the bargaining power to the plaintiffs as they have little to lose from 
the infringement trial. This may lead to defendants being forced into unfavorable 
settlement agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Während der private und gesellschaftliche Nutzen von Patenten in der theoretischen 
und empirischen Innovationsökonomik bereits ausgiebig erforscht wurde, mehren sich 
in den letzten Jahren zunehmend Studien, die potentielle negative Effekte von Pa-
tenten aufgreifen. Diese entstehen, wenn die für einen Innovator durch das Patent-
system entstehenden Kosten den Nutzen übersteigen (Bessen und Meurer 2008). 
Wenn zum Beispiel Patentstreitigkeiten einen rechtmäßigen Patentinhaber oder einen 
versehentlichen Verletzer eines Patentes schädigen, gleicht dies einer ex-post Steuer 
auf den Innovationsaufwand und führt zu einer ex-ante Reduktion von Innovationsan-
reizen (Bessen und Meurer 2008). 
Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht diese Studie wie Patentverletzungsverfahren den 
Firmenwert des Klägers (Patentinhabers) und des Beklagten beeinflussen. Aufgrund 
der Tatsache, dass in Patentprozesse involvierte Patente besonders wertvoll sind, 
erwarte ich, dass sich Entscheidungen über die Verletzung dieser Patente im Firmen-
wert widerspiegeln. 
Diese Studie hat zwei Ziele. Zum einen wird der Einfluss von Patentverletzungspro-
zessen  und deren Ausgang auf Kläger und Beklagten in einem stilisierten Modell dar-
gestellt. Hier wird insbesondere auf die Eigenheiten des deutschen Rechtssystems 
eingegangen. In einem zweiten Schritt werden die aus dem Modell abgeleiteten Hypo-
thesen empirisch getestet, indem Veränderung im Bonitätsindex einer Firma als Indi-
kator für Veränderungen im Firmenwert genutzt werden.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich Patentverletzungsprozesse tatsächlich im Firmen-
wert widerspiegeln. Für die Beklagten ist der Einfluss negativ, wenn sie verlieren oder 
einem Vergleich zustimmen, während sich bei einem Sieg keine Veränderung zeigt. 
Des Weiteren wird deutlich, dass kleine und unerfahrene Beklagte im Vergleich zu 
großen und erfahreneren Firmen im Nachteil sind, sobald sie in einen Prozess invol-
viert werden. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass sie stärker von durch Unsicherheit ausge-
lösten wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Schwierigkeiten betroffen sind. 
Im Gegensatz dazu zeigt sich ein durchgängig positiver Effekt von Verletzungsver-
fahren auf den Kläger (Patentinhaber), unabhängig vom Prozessausgang.  
Die Ergebnisse stimmen mit den theoretischen Überlegungen zur Praxis des deut-
schen Patentverletzungssystems überein. Die zeitliche und örtliche Trennung von 
Patentverletzungsklagen und den zugehörigen, als Verteidigung der Beklagten ge-
nutzten, Patentnichtigkeitsklagen, bringt dem Patentinhaber einen strategischen 
Vorteil. Da Nichtigkeitsklagen meist erst nach dem Urteil zur Patentverletzung ent-
schieden werden, liegt ein Großteil der Verhandlungsmacht beim Kläger, der nur indi-
rekt vom Verlust seines Patents bedroht ist. Dies erhöht seinen Verhandlungsspiel-
raum im Patentverletzungsprozess und ermöglicht einen vorteilhaften Vergleich. 
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Abstract
I analyse how patent litigation outcome in Germany affects the performance of
the disputing firms by interpreting changes in a firm's credit rating as a proxy
for changes in firm performance. The results match theoretical considerations on
the functioning of the bifurcated German patent litigation system: The separation
of litigation and invalidity decisions, resulting in invalidity decisions taking much
longer than decisions on infringement, provides patent holders with a window of
opportunity to enforce patents that may later be invalidated. This shifts a major
share of the immediate risk to the defendant and allocates bargaining power to
the plaintiff. The estimation results provide support for this incongruity. Plaintiffs
on average profit from litigation while defendants agreeing upon a settlement deal
lose as much as defendants losing in trial. I further show that small, inexperienced
defendant firms are at a disadvantage when dealing with litigation.
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1 Introduction
The benefits of patents for society as well as for patentees have extensively
been studied in the theoretical and empirical economics of innovation litera-
ture (Nordhaus 1962, Jaffe and Traitenberg 2002, Scotchmer 2004). Private
benefits arise from innovation returns to the patented technology that exceed
the patent's R&D costs. These materialize through an increased market share,
a price premium for high quality products, the reduction of production costs
or from licensing revenues (Greenhalgh and Rogers 2007). Many contributions
have shown that patents and patent quality as measured by forward citations
in general have a positive effect on firm value that goes beyond the R&D ex-
penditures of the firm (Hall 2000, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005, Czarnitzki
and Kraft 2004).
In recent years however, with the increased focus on the notion of probabilistic
patents (Lemley and Shapiro 2005), researchers have more and more stressed
potential negative effects of patents. These negative effects can arise if the
estimated costs of the patent system to an innovator exceed the estimated
benefits (Bessen and Meurer 2008a). This is the case if the profit an innovat-
ing firm receives from owning its own patents is smaller than the cost it has to
incur to hold off allegations of patent infringement (Collins 2009, p.1). These
costs may for example be related to the validity decision of the patent. Farrell
and Shapiro (2008) demonstrate that in case of uncertain property rights de-
termining patent validity prior to licensing (as a measure to avoid litigation)
is socially beneficial as weak patents can still yield high licensing royalties
because "challenging the patent is a public good for the downstream firms"
(Farrell and Shapiro 2008, p. 1362). And Shapiro (2010) shows that for weak
patents, covering a minor feature of a high-margin product that takes time to
redesign, a large fraction of royalties negotiated during patent litigation can
be attributable to hold-up and not to the value of the patented technology as
such.
If there is a negative impact of patent litigation for patentees or inadvertent
infringers an ex-post tax is imposed on the innovation (Bessen and Meurer
2008b, p. 3) which can result in an ex-ante reduction of innovation incentives
(Bessen and Meurer 2008b, p.26).
Against this background the contribution at hand considers the costs and ben-
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efits of patents by analysing how patent litigation affects the performance of
the disputing firms. Making use of the fact that patents involved in patent
infringement litigation are generally located the very top of the patent value
distribution (Lanjouw Schankermann 2001, 2004, Cremers 2004) and thus con-
stitute highly valuable intangible assets I expect decisions about the infringe-
ment of these highly valuable patents to be reflected in the performance of the
firms involved in litigation.
This paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to model, in a styl-
ized way, the impact of patent litigation and its outcome on the firm value of
the plaintiff and the defendant, taking into account the particularities of the
German patent litigation system. The second objective is to empirically test
the hypotheses derived from this stylized model by using changes in credit
rating for German firms as a proxy for changes in firm performance. A condi-
tional difference-in-difference approach can be applied to evaluate the effect of
patent litigation on the performance of both plaintiff and defendant, which is
then analyzed with respect to differences between trial outcome, trial-specific
characteristics as well as firm characteristics.
I find evidence that defendants are negatively affected by a loss in trial or a set-
tlement deal, while a victory leaves their rating unchanged. I further show that
small and inexperienced defendants are at a disadvantage compared to larger
and more experienced firms, indicating that they are affected more severely
by business disruption and financial distress. By contrast I find a positive
treatment effect of litigation on the plaintiffs, independent of the outcome
of the case. The results match theoretical considerations on the functioning
of the bifurcated patent litigation system in Germany: The temporal sepa-
ration of decisions on patent infringement claims and corresponding patent
invalidity (counter) claims provides a strategic advantage to the plaintiff. The
delayed decision of invalidity counterclaims (temporarily) shifts a large share
of the bargaining power to the plaintiffs as they have little to lose from the
infringement trial. This may lead to defendants being forced into unfavorable
settlement agreements.
This paper builds on the existing literature on the impact of litigation on firm
value, but to my knowledge is the first to disentagle the effect with respect to
the different trial outcomes and the first to consider the particularities of the
German system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes
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existing studies on the effect of litigation on firm value. Section 3 presents a
stylized model of the effect of litigation on plaintiffs and defendants. I derive
several hypotheses on the impact of litigation on firm performance. Section 4
contains the empirical analysis, starting with an argument for credit rating as
a measure for firm performance, followed by the the estimation approach, a
data description and the descriptive analysis. I then present the matching pro-
cedure and terminate with the estimation results and some robustness checks.
Section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Previous Empirical Literature
Most empirical contributions focusing on the private costs of patent litigation
make use of stock market data and apply event study methods. The basic
concept of the event study methodology in the context of patent infringe-
ment suits is that new information contained in the beginning or termination
of patent infringement litigation leads the market to update its expectations
about future profits and to accordingly adjust the stock market value of the
firm. Abnormal stock returns are then attributed to the litigation effect and
used to quantify the effect of litigation on the market value of the firm.
Bessen and Meurer (2008b) estimate the expected private costs of patent lit-
igation filing by using the event study methodology. Their sample obtained
from Derwent' s LitAlert database covers most patent lawsuits filed against
US public firms from 1984 to 1999. They find that the cumulative abnormal
returns around the filing date of the cases show a loss of 0.62% of the stock
market value for alleged infringers. The effect for patentee litigants is -0.38%.
The expected joint loss to the litigating parties is therefore negative. Consider-
ing factors influencing the abnormal returns, Bessen and Meurer find patentee
litigants with high liabilities relative to assets to have more negative returns.
They further find that belonging to different industries increases the loss in
stock market value for the alleged infringer, that small infringers suffer larger
losses, and that being sued by a new public firm litigant makes alleged in-
fringers better off. They find some limited evidence that R&D intensive firms
are affected by more negative returns.
Using a small sample of 65 pairs of plaintiffs and defendants involved in lit-
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igation in the information technology industry Raghu et al. (2008) estimate
that the filing of patent infringement litigation has negative effects for the
stock market of the defendant firm, but positive effects for plaintiff firms. The
combined abnormal returns for the plaintiff and defendant firms are found to
be negative.
Using a small sample of 108 Taiwanese patent litigation suits in the electronic
industry Wang et al. (2010) find that patent litigation negatively affects the
prices of the defendants' underlying stocks. Marco (2005) compares market re-
sponses to patent litigation ruling in 475 US patent litigation cases to market
responses to the particular patent's grant und finds that the resolution about
invalidity or infringement is worth as much as the initial patent grant.
Using data on 355 corporate lawsuit filing and settlement announcements in
the Wall Street Journal 1981 to 1983, including patent litigation, Bhagat et al.
(1994) estimate the stock-market reactions to inter-firm litigation. The mar-
ket reaction to the filing of the 20 patent infringement cases included in their
database shows that in the 2-day window ending on the day the case appears
in the Wall Street Journal, the combined market value of the plaintiff and
defendant falls on average -3.1 percent.
Focusing on US biotech firms between 1980 and 1992 Lerner (1995) finds for
the 26 litigation cases occuring within that period that in the same 2-day
window the combined market-adjusted change in market value of plaintiff and
defendant falls by two percent.
The major difference of these contributions to my approach is the fact that
they use stock market data instead of credit rating information. In addition
to this they mostly look at the effect of litigation filing while I differentiate
between the effect of the different outcomes of trial.
3 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses
In order to understand how patent litigation may affect the involved plaintiffs
and defendants I start by summarizing the main features and specificities of
the German patent litigation system. As the outcome of the trial case is the
most crucial factor for the effect of litigation on the value of a firm, affecting
the market shares and economic freedom of the plaintiff and defendant, I then
present a simple scheme of the basic effects of different trial outcomes on the
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involved plaintiffs and defendants. In the subsequent section I relax some of
the assumptions of the model and discuss how further factors may affect the
reaction of the litigator's performance to litigation.
3.1 The German Patent Litigation System
A granted patent, coming from a German patent application or from a Germany-
designated European Patent Office (EPO) application, becomes national law.
If the patentee or one of his licensors suspects the infringement of the patent
by another firm or an individual, he can send an official warning to the in-
fringer (caution), asking him to stop infringing the patented invention and
to provide a legally binding "cease and desist" declaration. If the defendant
does not react, the plaintiff may file a suit that is aimed at declaring and
prohibiting the infringement as well as defining the damages to be paid to
the patentee/licensee. The defendant may be required to destroy produced
goods that use the disputed technology. The major difference of the German
system compared to most other systems is the practice of bifurcation, the
separation of nullity and infringement decisions. While patent infringement
cases are dealt with by the district courts, decisions about the nullity of a
patent are dealt with at the German Federal Patent Court. In an infringe-
ment suit the patent is generally assumed to be valid and the decision made
concerns only the infringement action. The threat of a nullification of the dis-
puted patent is thus less prevalent than in most other countries such as the
US. It is however possible and common practice for the defendant to file a
nullity suit at the Federal Patent Court as a defense to the infringement suit.
In this case, given that the nullity suit has some chance of success, the district
courts will sometimes defer their decision until the nullity suit has been de-
cided. Usually however, the invalidity suit is not decided yet when a decision
about infringement is rendered. The delayed decision of invalidity trials at the
German Patent Court connected to infringement trials at the district courts
is frequently referred to as injunction gap or injunction trap, hinting at the
temporal incongruities of these interconnected trials. A visalization of this can
be found in Appendix 7.2. Given that an additional trial with new costs risks
has to be opened by the defendant the hurdle to file a nullity claim is much
higher than in systems without bifurcation. The risk for the patent owner of
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losing the monopoly rights thus still exists, but only through an indirect link.
The losing party is obliged to pay the attorney fees of the winning party and
the court costs. The attorney and court fees are being calculated according to
a formula based on the estimated value of the dispute. For a detailed overview
on the infringement proceedings in Germany please refer to European Patent
Office (2010), Busche et al. (2010), Pitz (2010) and Stauder (1989).
3.2 A Simple Model of the Effect of Litigation on Plaintiff and Defendant
The following scheme depicts in a stylized way the pre- and post-trial payoffs
from using the patented technology for the plaintiff and defendant. I suppose
that there are only two firms producing a similar product with the technology,
which is claimed to be patent protected by the patentee. Prior to litigation the
market is split between the two firms, such that both obtain a payoff of 1/2V ,
the profit to be obtained from that particular product in the German market.
V denotes the overall profit to be obtained from the market, D denotes the
damages to be paid by the defendant in case of losing and C denotes the trial
costs. P stands for the expected probability of the plaintiff prevailing in trial.
I assume the decision by the court to be rendered immediately such that there
are no costs of delay or business disruption and I assume that no decision
about the validity of the patent will be involved.
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Table 1: Payoff Patentee
Payoff Win Loss Settlement
Pre-litigation 1
2
V 1
2
V 1
2
V
Post-Litigation V +D 1
2
V − C S >= p(V +D) + (1− p)(1
2
V − C)
∆ Payoff 1
2
V +D −C −C < ∆Payoff< 1
2
V +D
Table 2: Payoff Defendant
Payoff Win Loss Settlement
Pre-litigation 1
2
V 1
2
V 1
2
V
Post-Litigation 1
2
V 0− C −D S <= p(0− C −D) + (1− p)(1
2
V )
∆ Payoff 0 −C −D − 1
2
V −C −D − 1
2
V < ∆Payoff< 0
Prior to litigation the payoff for both will be 1
2
V as the market is split equally
between the two firms. If the plaintiff wins the trial, meaning that infringement
is declared and damages are awarded, the payoff after litigation comprises the
entire market (V ) as the defendant has to render his share of the market to the
plaintiff plus the damages obtained from the defendant to cover lost profits
(D). Compared to the pre-trial situation the plaintiff thus improves by 1
2
V +D.
When losing in trial the plaintiff obtains a similar payoff as prior to trial which
is the duopoly payoff 1
2
V . As the losing party also has to cover the trial costs
the overall payoff is 1
2
V − C which downgrades the plaintiff's situation by
−C compared to the pre-trial setting. In case of a settlement the payoff lies
in between the payoff obtained from winning and the payoff obtained from
losing in trial, depending on the probability of the plaintiff prevailing in trial.
As trial costs C are rather small compared to damages 1 and the profit that
can be obtained from the patent, the plaintiff's payoff from settlement will
usually make him better off compared to the pre-trial setting. This is due
to the little risk the plaintiff has when entering into trial in this simplified
model. The only risk is the risk of having to cover the trial costs when losing.
1 For a jurisdictional value of 2 million Euros the overall trial costs are 100000 Euros
and include court costs and lawyer costs for both parties (Meissner Bolte 2012). See
Harhoff (2009, p. 31) for a comparison of countries.
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Given that trial costs are rather negligible compared to the other costs such
as damages, it becomes clear that the average effect of litigation on plaintiffs
should be positive.
The situation for the defendant is different. If he wins the pre-trial situation
is unchanged as the two firms keep sharing the market. If, however, he loses in
trial he has to give up his share of the market, pay damages and cover the trial
costs, which makes him definitely worse off. In case of a settlement deal the
best case would be a payoff as in case of a victory which leaves the pre-trial
situation unchanged. All other possible settlement deals make the defendant
worse off compared to the pre-trial setting.
This very simplistic setting demonstrates that the plaintiff is generally at an
advantage as he has far less to lose from trial than the defendant. In two out
of three possible outcomes (win and settle) the plaintiff is likely to improve
his situation, whereas a loss will only result in comparatively little costs. The
defendant on the contrary is likely to worsen in two out of three possible
outcomes (loss and settle) and to not experience any change in case of winning.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The average effect of litigation on defendants is expected to
be negative, while the average effect on plaintiffs is expected to be positive.
Hypothesis 2: A loss or a settlement outcome negatively affects the firm
value of the defendant while winning keeps his firm value unchanged. A loss
is expected to have a more severe impact than a settlement outcome.
Hypothesis 3: A victory or a settlement outcome positively affects the firm
value of the plaintiff while losing keeps the firm value unchanged.
3.3 The Role of Uncertainty
The above model abstracts from some important features of patent litigation
reality to stress the main effects expected from the different outcomes of lit-
igation. I will now consider additional factors affecting firm value that come
into play when relaxing two of the model assumptions. The first assumption
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that needs to be relaxed is that the court immediately renders a decision. This
assumption implies that there are no costs of delay or business disruption and
that the business partners of the involved firms do not take notice of the trial.
In reality the average patent litigation trial however takes almost 1 year. Dur-
ing this period the involved firms and their business partners face uncertainty
about outcome and costs of the trial. This may lead to interrupted business
activities; taking out a loan may become more difficult and the distraction of
management may result in inefficient investments (Bhagat et al. 1994). The
empirical literature on financial distress suggests that these costs are sub-
stantial 2 . A firm's ability to deal with business disruption and financial or
economic distress depends on its overall size, experience and diversification of
risk. As suggested by previous literature on patent litigation I expect small
firms to be affected more severely by litigation than larger firms due to less
financial flexibility. I expect this effect to be more pronounced for defendants
as these are the ones that may be faced with a preliminary injunction and the
risk of no longer being able to use a technology, which may alter their busi-
ness partner's willingness to sign business contracts. I further expect firms
with prior experience in IP disputes to be able to deal with uncertainty and
distress more easily which should be reflected in repeat litigators being bet-
ter off from litigation than first-time litigators. Regarding the diversification
of risk I expect the impact of uncertainty costs to be more pronounced if a
patent is particularly important to the business of the patentee or infringer.
The stakes in the case will be measured in three different ways. The first mea-
sure differs for plaintiffs and defendants: For defendants it is dummy variable
indicating whether the defendant is a trader rather than a producer of goods
using the patented technology. It is supposed to capture whether the defen-
dants production facility depends on the disputed technology and may have
to pause during trial or may have to be changed when losing the case. For the
plaintiffs I build a similar measure that indicates whether the plaintiff is a sim-
ple licensee compared to being the patentee himself or the exclusive licensee.
The stakes for patentees or exclusive licensees are expected to be much higher
than for a firm that is a licensee among numerous other licensees. The second
2 In their case study Cutler and Summers (1988) examine capital-market reactions
to different events in the lawsuit Pennzoil vs. Texaco and show that for every dollar
Texaco lost, Pennzoil gained only 17 cents. They attribute this to the financial
distress imposed on Texaco by the lawsuit (Bhagat et al. 1994).
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measure relates the value at stake to the overall turnover of the firm. If the
relative importance is small, the effect of litigation is expected to be small as
well, whereas a firm that highly relies on the disputed technology should be
affected more severely. The third measure of the involved stakes is the number
of fellow plaintiffs or defendants. These considerations lead to the next three
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4: The effect of litigation is more severe for small firms.
Hypothesis 5: Repeat litigants have an advantage in coping with litigation
compared to first time litigants.
Hypothesis 6: Parties with lower stakes are affected less severely by litigation
than parties with high stakes in the case.
3.4 The Role of Nullity Suits
The second model assumption that needs to be relaxed is that no decision
about the validity of the patent will be involved, such that the plaintiffs over-
all risk in the case is rather small. The bifurcation system in Germany is
characterized by an indirect link of infringement and nullity trials. Though in-
fringement trials generally assume the disputed patent to be valid it is possible
for the defendant to file an invalidity suit at the German Patent Court as an
act of defense to the accusation of infringement (Again see Appendix 7.2 for a
flowchart of the process). The possibility of filing a nullity suit shifts some of
the risk to the plaintiff that suddenly may be faced by the threat of losing his
monopoly right. The nullity suit filed at the German Patent Court can either
be allowed or rejected. If rejected the defendant faces the court costs for this
additional trial, and the infringement trial continues as before. If the nullity
suit is accepted there are two options: Either the infringement trial continues
as usual and the decision about validity is delivered ex post or, in high doubt
of the validity of the patent, the infringement trial is put on hold until the
validity question has been resolved. In the first case the infringement trial
is not disturbed by the validity decision and the firm value of the firms will
not yet be affected by any validity decisions, but only by the outcome of the
infringement trial. If the infringement trial is delayed until the decision about
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the validity of the patent and the patent is declared invalid the infringement
suit will be dropped. In this case the plaintiff loses his monopoly right and has
to cover the trial costs. Interviews with lawyers and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that putting a case on hold for the nullity proceedings rarely happens.
This implies that in most cases the nullity suit should not have an immediate
impact on the firm value of the plaintiff. If however a patent is (partially)
invalidated while the infringement trial is put on hold this should negatively
affect the firm value of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then has to cover the trial
costs and accept the loss of his monopoly right. As I am able to match the
litigated patents to a database from the German Patent Office, containing all
invalidity trials at the German Patent Court, I am able to identify whether a
patent has been partially or entirely invalidated during the infringement trial.
As expected this rarely happens. For thirty percent of the cases a nullity suit
is filed, which results in a (partial) invalidation in 20 percent of the nullity
suits (6 percent of all cases) 3 . However, I observe an invalidation that is de-
cided upon during the proccedings of the infringement suit for only 13 of our
observations, which is less than 1 percent of all cases. I expect the rare event
of nullification during trial to significantly affect the firm value of the plaintiff.
Hypothesis 7a: If a nullity suit comes up during trial and the patent is
(partially) invalidated while the infringement case is put on hold the firm
value of the plaintiff is negatively affected.
Hypothesis 7b: On the contrary I expect a positive effect for the defendant
that will profit in form of a win in trial or a very favorable settlement deal if
the patent is invalidated during trial.
3 All other nullity suits are either abandoned because of a settlement deal or the
patent has been upheld. The data provided by the German Patent Office unfortu-
nately does not distinguish between these 2 options.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Credit Rating as Approach to Measure the Private Value of Intellectual
Property
Empirical studies so far have estimated the impact of litigation by using the
market value approach. The classical market value approach introduced into
the innovation literature by Griliches (1981) and put forward extensively by
Hall(2000) and Hall et al. (2005) is based on the idea that the private returns
to innovative activity can be measured via the market value of that firm 4 .
The advantage of the market value approach is that data is available on a
daily basis and changes can thus be identified precisely using the event study
methodology. The most severe drawback is that it is only feasible for firms
listed in the stock market which reduced the size of the sample. For Germany
where only a small share of all firms is listed in the stock market, such a
sample would not be representative for the entire economy.
To address this shortcoming I follow Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004, 2007) who
have first used credit rating data for German firms to analyze the impact of
innovation activities on firm value. Credit rating information is available for
almost every firm looking for bank loans or supplier credits and thus covers a
much broader range of companies. While stock market data is associated with
the market's expectation of future profits and may well be affected by short-
term fluctuation in shareholder confidence, credit rating information is based
on the evaluation of default risk by a rating agency that rates basically all
German firms. The German credit rating agency Creditreform provides credit
rating data calculated based on business and financial risks, such as industry
characteristics, competitive position, management, productivity, profitability,
liquidity as well as financial policy and flexibility. "Thus a rating reflects both
currently observable firm characteristics and expectations regarding future
developments"(Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004, p. 378), which makes it suitable as
a proxy for changes in firm value or performance. The index takes values from
100 to 600, with 100 being the best possible rating and 600 denoting default
and insolvency procedures.
4 For papers that have analyzed the market value of patent applications and grants
see for example Austin (1993) and Darby et al. (2004)
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4.2 Estimation Approach
Given the theoretical considerations and the advantages of using changes in
credit rating data as a proxy for changes in firm performance, the idea of the
empirical approach is to analyze the impact of being involved in patent litiga-
tion on the credit rating of the firm. This is the difference between the rating of
a firm having been involved in litigation and the rating of that firm in case of
not having been involved in litigation. The main challenge for this empirical
methodology is the estimation of the so-called counterfactual situation, the
rating of the firm had it not been involved in litigation. As factors affecting
the litigation probability are at the same time affecting the future firm perfor-
mance, the treatment (being involved in litigation) is an endogenous variable
in the estimation of firm performance. The econometric literature on treat-
ment effects suggests a number of methods that can be applied to control for
this endogeneity problem (Blundell and Costa-Dias 2009). I will apply the con-
ditional difference-in-difference estimator, a mixture of the matching method
and the difference in difference estimator, in this paper. The DiD estimator is
estimated as the difference between the outcome of the treated firm after the
treatment and the outcome of the treated firm prior to its treatment. In order
to control for general macroeconomic changes a second difference is calculated
between the outcome of a non-treated control sample observed for the same
time period that matches with respect to a set of observable characteristics
that affect the selection into treatment. The difference in rating between the
treatment group and the matched group of twin firms can then be attributed
to the litigation effect. A detailed description of this estimator can be found
in the Appendix.
4.3 Data
This paper is based on firm-level patent litigation data of German firms. The
underlying patent litigation database comprises litigation court records cov-
ering about 80% of all patent litigation cases filed in Germany between 2000
and 2008. As no centralized register exists this comprehensive database has
been collected manually by going into the archives of the three major patent
litigation courts in Germany. For this analysis the most relevant information
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available in this database is the identity of plaintiffs and defendants, the patent
number of the litigated patents, the start and end date and the outcome of
trial. I further use information on the value of the court case and the relation-
ship of the involved plaintiffs and defendants to the disputed patent.
The litigation trials handle disputes about the infringement of German patents
that can arise between German and foreign firms active in the German mar-
ket. I restrict the analysis to German firms involved in litigation as plaintiffs
or defendants as firm level data and credit rating information is available for
Germany only.
These firms have been matched to the Mannheim Enterprise Panel, a biannual
panel data set of firms located in Germany maintained at ZEW in cooperation
with Creditreform, the largest business information service in Germany. The
Mannheim Enterprise Panel contains detailed firm data, amongst others, on
employment, sales, legal form, founding date, sectors, bankruptcy events and
the credit rating. The Mannheim Enterprise Panel has been matched to patent
applications at the European Patent office such that I can construct a patent
stock variable for each firm as well as the distribution of the patent stock
across six broad technology areas. In addition to providing firm information
for firms involved in litigation the Mannheim Enterprise Panel is also used as
basis for the control group.
4.4 Descriptives
The unit of analysis is a firm-trial case observation, a firm involved in a par-
ticular court case as either plaintiff or defendant. After dropping those cases
starting prior to 2001, where no rating information was available yet, I obtain
4243 firm-trial observations for the period 2001 to 2008. These observations
involve 2406 firms. Before starting a detailed description of the database used
I have to pay close attention to the possibility that a firm may be involved
in different trials that overlap with respect to the time frame of the trials. A
firm can obviously be involved in several trials at the same time that either
start or end in the same year or just overlap for some of the trial time. If
this is the case changes in rating cannot unambiguously be attributed to one
particular trial case and its outcome. 538 out of the 2406 firms involved in
litigation are involved in multiple overlapping trials at once. I chose to ex-
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clude those overlapping firm-trial observations from the database in order to
reduce the blurring effect of confounding parallel trials 5 . I need to keep in
mind that by doing so I exclude the very litigious firms that are constantly
involved in patent litigation trials and thereby no longer analyse the entire
population of litigation cases. This restriction reduces the database to 2171
firm-trial observations. For 1558 of those observations I observe the change in
credit rating from half a year prior to trial to half a year after the end of trial.
This database then contains 1432 different firms and 1244 court cases, indi-
cating that firms can appear multiple (non-overlapping) times and one trial
case can appear in combination with different firms, which can be different
plaintiffs or defendants.
The dependent variable of interest is the change in credit rating half a year
after trial compared to half a year prior to trial. This variable compares the
valid credit rating of a firm shortly after trial has ended to the last valid pre-
trial rating that is observed within the 6 month prior to trial. As credit rating
is defined on a scale from 100 to 600, with 100 indicating the best and 600 the
worst possible rating, a positive delta can be interpreted as a worsening of the
rating while a negative delta indicates an improvement of the rating 6 . Table
3 summarizes the change in rating for all firm-trial observations and distin-
guishes between plaintiffs and defendants as well as the different outcomes of
trial. I see that on average the rating increases by 9.6 rating points, which
indicates a worsening of the rating. Looking at plaintiffs and defendants sep-
arately I find that the change in rating differs significantly between plaintiffs
and defendants. The rating for defendants increases by 12.2 points while the
rating for plaintiffs increases by only 5.4 points. This difference is statistically
significant at a 5% significance level. When taking into account the outcome
of trial, which can be a victory, a loss, a settlement or a partial victory/loss,
I find that the change in rating varies with respect to the outcome of trial.
While the differences across outcomes are not significant in the group of plain-
tiffs there are highly significant differences between winning and losing in the
5 This excludes 22% of the firms involved in litigation.
6 The rating is available to us on a half-yearly basis, such that we obtain the most
recent rating every 6 months. If there is no change in rating the previous rating is
reported as it does not lose validity. The rating of a firm is updated upon request
and adapted every time one of the input values (such as expected turnover, order
situation) changes. Larger firms are also researched without request on a regular
basis.
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group of defendants.
Table 3: Observed Change in rating for all firm-trial observations
Change in rating Observations Mean Change in Rating Std. Dev. Min Max
All firm-trial observations 1558 9.6 58.0 -248.0 398.0
All Plaintiffs 597 5.4 45.6 -200.0 395.0
All Defendants 961 12.2 64.4 -248.0 398.0
Plaintiff Win 136 7.0 34.9 -86.0 264.0
Plaintiff Loss 122 3.6 46.0 -200.0 307.0
Plaintiff Settlement 294 5.2 49.4 -199.0 395.0
Plaintiff Partial Win 45 7.4 48.6 -100.0 266.0
Defendant Win 131 2.0 48.0 -120.0 328.0
Defendant Loss 235 16.0 67.7 -103.0 396.0
Defendant Settlement 507 13.6 65.8 -115.0 398.0
Defendant Partial Loss 87 9.2 67.7 -248.0 375.0
4.5 Matching Procedure
As I do not know whether the worsening of the rating that I observe is due to
the litigation effect or due to an overall trend that applies to all firms I need
to compare the change in rating to a control group of similar firms observed
for the similar time period. The goal is therefore to apply a difference in dif-
ference approach that compares the change in rating of each litigating firm
to the change in rating of a similar firm over the same time span. This "twin
firm" should exhibit a similar ex-ante probability of being involved in litiga-
tion as the firm actually involved in litigation. This means that when chosing
that firm I need to consider the literature on firm-level drivers of litigation:
There are currently only two contributions investigating the driving factors of
litigation at the firm level. These are Bessen and Meurer (2005) and Ziedonis
(2003) focusing on patent litigation among semiconductor companies. Bessen
and Meurer (2005) show that the size of the firms, the number of patents
held by potential plaintiffs, the R&D performed by prospective defendants,
the capital intensity of the parties, and the technological distance between the
parties matter for the litigation likelihood. The likelihood of being involved in
trial as alleged infringer increases with the R&D spending of a firm, indicating
that fuzzy patent boundaries can make firms unintended infringers. Ziedonis
(2003) finds that firms involved in litigation are characterized by larger patent
portfolios, numbers of employees and sales. The results by Bessen and Meurer
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and Ziedonis indicate that size, patent portfolio, R&D expenditures, market
value and technology area all matter for the litigation decision and should thus
be used for the matching procedure. As R&D expenditures are not available
in the Mannheim Enterprise Panel I use patents as a proxy and instead of
market value I use the credit rating.
In order to obtain "twin" firms I proceed in two steps: In a first step I use the
Mannheim Enteprise Panel to draw a stratified control group for the litigat-
ing firms. This is done to reduce the large database of more than 20 Million
observations to a more manageable size. The second step then uses this strat-
ified control group to conduct a propensity score matching that will yield one
control observation for each litigation observation.
4.5.1 Step 1: Stratified control group
I refer to the Mannheim Enterprise Panel and start by drawing a stratified
control group in order to reduce the large sample of potential control firms. For
each of the 1558 firm-trial observation I draw 50 control firms 7 that match, for
the same year as the litigation firm, with respect to legal form, a broad firm size
category, industry (as measured by 2 digit WZ-codes) and a dummy indicating
whether the firm owns EPO-patents. For these control firms I extract credit
rating information for the same time span as for their corresponding litigating
firms, such that the change in rating can be compared between treated and
non-treated firms observed for the exact same time period. The variables used
for the pre-selection of potential controls are defined as follows:
• Legal form of the firm is variable indicating the form of organization
of he firm, wich can be for example a limited liability company, a general
partnership, or a corporation.
• Firm size range is categorical variable dividing the firms with respect to
their pre-trial number of employees in 10 different size categories (<10, 1-19,
20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-9999, 10000-49999, >=50000).
• Industry classification is the industry classification as measured by 2
digit WZ-2008-codes.
7 Note that for many firms I found less than 50 potential controls such that the
control group size is not equal to 50*1558. However, for 95% of all firms I was able
to find at least 20 potential control firms.)
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• EP Dummy is a dummy indicating whether the firm owns EPO-patents.
Table 4 and 5 compare the litigating firms, distinguishing between plaintiffs
and defendants, to their samples of potential control firms with respect to the
observed change in credit rating, the pre-trial rating, the size as measured by
employees, and the technology distribution of the firm's patent stock. While
there is obviously no significant difference with respect to the set of variables
used for stratifying the group of potential controls (not reported) I find that
the average patent stock, the size of the companies and particularly the pre-
trial rating differ significantly. When conducting a matching to obtain a more
similar control sample the most important factor will be matching on the pre-
trial rating as the treatment group, both for plaintiffs and defendants, exhibits
an about 15 rating points better rating than the control group.
The variable of interest, the change in rating, differs between the plaintiff
and defendants and their respective potential control groups. The difference is
only significant for the group of plaintiffs compared to their potential control
group. While the rating increases by 8.9 points for the potential control group
it only increases by 5.4 points for the plaintiffs, indicating that plaintiffs on
average profit from litigation. At this point of the analysis I find a significant
treatment effect of being involved in litigation as plaintiff, but no effect for
defendants.
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Table 4: Comparison of defendants and their potential control group
Defendants Potential Controls p-value of two-
N=961 N=36928 sided test on
mean differences
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
L2_employees 1215.7 10857.6 1.0 194982.0 383.5 5201.5 1.0 362063.0 0.0
Patent stock 6.4 40.0 0.0 930.8 1.8 25.6 0.0 3941.5 0.0
L2_Credit_Rating 223.1 51.7 100.0 600.0 237.4 70.4 100.0 600.0 0.0
Age 27.8 31.1 1.0 208.0 28.8 36.6 0.0 1004.0 0.3
Share_Electrical_Engineering 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0
Share_Instruments 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.6
Share_Chemistry 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1
Share_Process_Engineering 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1
Share_Mechanical_Engineering 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0
Share_Consumption 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0
P(X) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Change in credit rating 12.2 64.4 -248.0 398.0 10.8 60.9 -409.0 473.0 0.5
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Table 5: Comparison of plaintiffs and their potential control group
Plaintiffs Potential Controls p-value of two-
N=597 N=21357 sided test on
mean differences
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
L2_employees 499.5 2608.7 1.0 43265.0 167.0 823.9 1.0 50000.0 0.0
Patent stock 15.4 81.3 0.0 1513.4 3.7 42.8 0.0 3620.7 0.0
L2_Credit_Rating 218.5 57.0 100.0 600.0 233.1 67.0 100.0 600.0 0.0
Age 38.3 37.1 2.0 190.0 32.1 43.2 -7.0 1003.0 0.0
Share_Electrical_Engineering 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0
Share_Instruments 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.0
Share_Chemistry 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.4
Share_Process_Engineering 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.4
Share_Mechanical_Engineering 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.9
Share_Consumption 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0
P(X) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Change in credit rating 5.4 45.6 -200.0 395.0 8.9 55.3 -322.0 478.0 0.1
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4.5.2 Step 2: Propensity Score Matching
In order to make sure that the control firms also match with respect to the
pre-trial date rating, the exact size, and the structure and size of their patent
portfolio I chose to follow a propensity score matching approach. This should
yield a control group that does no longer differ to the treatment group with
respect to these observables. Using the large sample of control firms already
stratified by sector, size, legal form and a patent dummy I conduct two propen-
sity score matchings, one for the plaintiffs and one for the defendants. I do so
by estimating two separate probit models for the treatments "plaintiff" and
"defendant" as theoretical considerations as well as existing empirical evidence
suggests that being involved as plaintiff or defendant is driven by different fac-
tors and that plaintiffs and defendants are affected differently by litigation.
The variables used to conduct the matching in order to obtain an even more
similar control group are defined as follows:
• L2.Credit_Rating measures the rating of the firm prior to the filing date
of the court case.
• L2.Employees measures the number of employees prior to the filing date
of the court case.
• Age measures the age of the firm in years at the beginning of trial.
• Patent stock measures the firm's patent stock at the time of trial. It is
measured by calculation the stock of EPO patent applications of the firm
starting from 1978 and by applying a depreciation rate of 15%.
• Technology distribution measures the the technology distribution of the
firm's patent stock over the 6 technology classes Electrical Engineering,
Instruments, Chemistry, Process Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and
Consumption.
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Matching Protocol
(1) Specify and estimate probit models to obtain the propensity scores P (Xˆ)
(2) Restrict sample to common support (if common support is small, matching is
not applicable)
(3) Choose one observation from subsample of treated firms and delete it from that
pool
(4) Calculate Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-treated firms in
order to find most similar control observation: MDij = (Xj −Xi)Ω−1Xj −Xi)
where Ω−1 is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching argument X (in
our case the propensity score) based on the sample of potential control firms.
(5) Select observation with minimum distance from remaining sample (selected
controls are not deleted from the control group) and additionally matching on
the pre-defined stratification categories (industry code, size category, patent
dummy, legal form, observed time span)
(6) Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on treated firms
(7) The average effect on the treated = mean difference of the change in rating of
matched samples
(8) Sampling with replacement can lead the ordinary t-statistic on mean differ-
ences to be biased (neglects appearance of repeated observations). Therefore I
need to correct standard errors by applying Lechners (2001) estimator for an
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors.
The probit models from the matching procedure can be found in the appendix.
Table 6 displays summary statistics after the propensity score matching. There
is no longer a statistically significant difference with respect to the matching
variables between the group of defendants and the control group. The propen-
sity score P(X) no longer differs between the two matched groups as it does
between the treated firms and their potential control group (see table 2 and
3). The change in rating differs between the defendants and the control group
such that defendants have a 12.2 point increase of their rating while the se-
lected control group exhibits an increase of 10.1 points only. The difference
is therefore 2.1 points, but it is not significantly different from zero. I cannot
identify a significant average treatment effect of litigation as a defendant on
the credit rating of a firm.
For the plaintiffs (table 7) I also find the control and treatment group to not
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differ significantly with respect to the matching variables, indicating that the
matching was successful. The increase in rating however is 8.6 rating points
higher for the selected control group compared to the plaintiffs. I therefore
find a positive treatment effect for plaintiffs 8 .
Table 6: Comparison of defendants and their selected control group
Defendants Selected Controls p-value of two-
N=961 N=961 sided test on
mean differences
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
L2_employees 1215.68 10857.55 1525.21 16020.20 0.62
Patent stock 6.38 40.03 4.45 41.25 0.299
L2_Credit_Rating 223.13 51.65 221.05 52.41 0.381
Age 27.81 31.0568 29.14 32.26 0.355
Share_Electrical_Engineering_Patents 0.10 0.26 0.09 0.26 0.794
Share_Instruments_Patents 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.20 0.692
Share_Chemistry_Patents 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.703
Share_Process_Engineering_Patents 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.25 0.968
Share_Mechanical_Engineering_Patents 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.25 0.703
Share_Consumption_Patents 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.561
P(X) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.538
Change in credit rating 12.20 64.35 10.13 54.53 0.447
8 Note that for plaintiffs, defendants as well as their matched control groups there
is no change in rating for about 40 percent of the observations.
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Table 7: Comparison of plaintiffs and their selected control group
Plaintiffs Selected Controls p-value of two-
N=597 N=597 sided test on
mean differences
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
L2_employees 499.47 2608.70 511.33 2502.43 0.94
Patent stock 15.36 81.29 23.81 221.47 0.46
L2_Credit_Rating 218.48 57.00 217.60 59.05 0.81
Age 38.34 37.11 37.04 36.84 0.59
Share_Electrical_Engineering_Patents 0.16 0.32 0.20 0.36 0.11
Share_Instruments_Patents 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.23 0.97
Share_Chemistry_Patents 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.21 0.87
Share_Process_Engineering_Patents 0.17 0.31 0.15 0.31 0.28
Share_Mechanical_Engineering_Patents 0.16 0.31 0.16 0.32 0.88
Share_Consumption_Patents 0.09 0.25 0.07 0.21 0.07
P(X) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.26
Change in credit rating 5.44 45.61 14.05 61.02 0.02
4.6 Disentangling the average treatment effects
Given the absence of a significant average treatment effect for being involved
in litigation as defendant and the positive average treatment effect of being
involved in litigation as plaintiff the next step is to try disentangling the av-
erage treatment effects with respect to specifics of the firms and the outcomes
of trial. I expect significant differences when testing whether the treatment
effects I observe vary across trial outcomes and firm characteristics. For doing
so I regress the change in credit rating on the entire set of matching variables
as well as the treatment variable (defendant or plaintiff). I then interact the
treatment effect (defendant or plaintiff) for each observation with the out-
comes of trial and with several firm characteristics expected to matter for the
change in rating. I estimate separate equations for the plaintiffs and defen-
dants. The estimation method is basic OLS and I cluster the standard errors
by firm as some firms appear multiple times in my dataset. I also control for
the trial year and the duration of the observed time span as this may affect
by how much the rating of both treated and non-treated firms changes. The
firm and trial variables used are defined as follows:
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• Loss is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the party has lost the case
and 0 otherwise.
• Win is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the party has won the case
and 0 otherwise.
• Settle is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the parties have settled the
case and 0 otherwise. I interpret dropped cases as settled as interviews with
specialized patent attorneys have indicated that parties often drop their
case but do not notify the court about a private settlement agreement.
• Partial Loss is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the defendant has
lost some but not all of the claims of the case and 0 otherwise.
• Partial Win is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the plaintiff has
won some but not all of the claims of the case and 0 otherwise.
• ln(L2.Employees) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the party has
less than 50 employees.
• Number Parties is an integer variable indicating how many firms are
involved in trial at the side of the firm of interest.
• Repeat Litigant is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the party is
involved in trial several times in our database and can thus be considered
more experienced in litigation.
• Defendant Trader is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the defendant
is a trader rather than a firm producing goods with the patented technology
and 0 otherwise.
• Plaintiff Simple Licensee is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
plaintiff is one among many licensees rather than the patentee himself or
his exclusive licensee.
• Value at stake/turnover is a variable measuring the importance of the
case relative to the firms overall turnover.
• Patent invalidated is a variable measuring whether the patent has been
invalidated during trial.
In a robustness check I have further included the Jaffe (1986) proximity mea-
sure for technological similarity of the patent portfolios of plaintiff and defen-
dant in order to see whether technological closeness alters the overall effect of
litigation. As this does not yield any significant results I do not report these
estimates due to limitations of space.
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4.6.1 Defendants
Table 8 displays the regression results for the defendants. Specification (1)
includes the simple treatment variable "defendant", indicating whether the
firm was involved in litigation as a defendant or whether it is a control firm.
As seen before there is no treatment effect of being involved in litigation as a
defendant as such. Specification (2) interacts the defendant dummy with the
different possible outcomes of trial, using a victory in trial as baseline cate-
gory. I find that a loss and a settlement outcome both significantly increase the
credit rating of the defendant compared to a win in trial, which corresponds
to a worsening of the rating. I find no difference for the outcome partial loss,
which may be due to the large degree of heterogeneity in this outcome cate-
gory. Specification (3) interacts the treatment dummy with the outcomes and
five other variables that are expected to have an effect on how a firm's rating
reacts to litigation. I again find that a loss and a settlement outcome both
significantly increase the credit rating of the defendant compared to a win
in trial. While differences across outcomes are already interesting as such, a
more meaningful result is a comparison of being involved in litigation with a
particular outcome to not being involved in litigation at all. In order to find
the overall effect of being involved as a defendant and losing, the coefficients
for defendant and loss have to be summed up. The overall effect is 21.9 and an
F-test indicates that this differs significantly from zero at the 10% significance
level. Similarly the effect of being involved as a defendant and agreeing upon
a settlement deal is 20.4 and also significantly different from zero. I further
find that the effect of losing and settling does not differ significantly. When
switching the baseline category for the outcomes to loss such that I can obtain
a coefficient for a win in trial I find that winning makes defendants signifi-
cantly better off than losing (as seen before), but I also find that the overall
treatment effect of being a defendant and winning compared to not being in
litigation is not significantly different from zero. I do find support for hypothe-
sis 2, stating that a loss and a settlement deal negatively affect the defendant.
I do however not find a significant difference between a loss and a settlement
deal.
The interaction with the number of employees shows that small defendants
are at a disadvantage when involved in litigation. I find the rating of repeat
litigants to drop by 7.1 points compared to the rating of first-time litigants
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when being involved in litigation, supporting our hypothesis that repeat liti-
gants are at an advantage in coping with alleged infringement. I further find
evidence for hypothesis 6 that focuses on the effect of stake size on the impact
of litigation: All three specifications of stake size show the expected effect.
Regarding the number of fellow parties accused of infringement in trial I find
more parties to coincide with an improvement of the rating, indicating that
sharing the risk in trial makes defendants better off. Defendants being traders
experience a drop of 7.8 rating points when involved in litigation compared to
a producers of goods produced with the patented technology. As production
goes along with costly facilities that might be shut down during trial or may
become obsolete when losing in trial stakes are generally higher for producers
compared to traders. The effect of the relative importance of the case for the
litigant as measured by the relation of the value at stake to the firm's overall
turnover also supports hypothesis 6. I further find that a (partial) invalidation
of the patent during trial makes the defendant significantly better off, which
can be attributed to the defendant profiting from a favorable settlement deal
with the plaintiff or a dropping of the case.
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Table 8: Interaction of the treatment effect with firm and trial-specific characteristics- Defendants
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Defendant 2.198 (2.682) −6.193 (4.722) 9.114 (7.112)
Defendant*Loss (baseline: Win) 12.044∗ (6.175) 12.742∗∗ (6.022)
Defendant*Settle (baseline: Win) 9.466∗ (5.193) 11.259∗∗ (4.954)
Defendant*Partial Loss (baseline: Win) 4.908 (8.338) 6.228 (8.176)
Repeat Litigant −7.056∗ (3.995)
Number of Defendant firms −2.868∗∗ (1.246)
Value at stake/turnover 0.916∗ (0.517)
Patent invalidated −37.191∗∗∗ (13.262)
Defendant trader −7.819∗ (4.065)
Defendant*Ln(L2.employees) −2.277∗ (1.204)
L2.Credit Rating −0.053 (0.039) −0.051 (0.039) −0.056 (0.039)
Share_ElectricalEng −11.181 (7.823) −10.656 (7.721) −11.315 (7.760)
Share_Instruments −24.357∗∗ (10.070) −23.045∗∗ (9.879) −23.486∗∗ (9.898)
Share_Chemistry −17.439∗∗ (8.434) −16.902∗∗ (8.321) −17.288∗∗ (8.316)
Share_ProcessEng −14.309∗∗ (7.062) −13.713∗∗ (6.973) −16.182∗∗ (6.956)
Share_MechanicalEng −9.617 (8.716) −9.481 (8.637) −10.143 (8.698)
Share_Consumption −17.483∗∗ (7.972) −17.438∗∗ (7.911) −17.087∗∗ (7.955)
Patent stock/L2.employees −0.094 (0.167) −0.111 (0.169) −0.329∗∗ (0.167)
EP dummy 13.089 (8.344) 12.729 (8.258) 13.042 (8.288)
Age 0.077 (0.068) 0.076 (0.068) 0.072 (0.068)
Ln(L2.employees) −1.963∗∗ (0.963) −1.949∗∗ (0.960) −0.775 (0.933)
Duration 3.531∗∗∗ (1.274) 3.566∗∗∗ (1.281) 4.298∗∗∗ (1.373)
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Legal form dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Constant 86.036 (62.847) 85.119 (62.062) 84.027 (60.491)
Observations 1922 1922 1922
R2 0.069 0.071 0.085
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
4.6.2 Plaintiffs
Table 9 display the regression results for the plaintiffs. Specification (1) in-
cludes the simple treatment variable "plaintiff", indicating whether the firm
was involved in litigation as a plaintiff or whether it is a control firm. Anal-
ogously to the descriptive results there is a positive treatment effect of being
involved in litigation as a plaintiff: The rating improves by 8.65 rating points
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when the firm is involved in litigation as plaintiff, which supports hypothe-
sis 1 stating that plaintiffs on average profit from litigation. Specification (2)
interacts the plaintiff dummy with the different possible outcomes of trial,
using a loss in trial as baseline category. I find none of these interaction ef-
fects to be able to explain or alter the litigation-induced increase in rating.
Hypothesis 3 can not be confirmed. Specification (3) interacts the treatment
dummy with five other variables that are expected to have an effect on how
the plaintiff's rating reacts to litigation. I do not find support for hypothesis 4
and 5, stressing the effects of experience and size, and I find limited evidence
for hypothesis 6, focussing on the effect of the relative stakes in the court case.
Plaintiffs that are simple licensees rather than the patentee or the unique li-
censee profit more from litigation which indicates that they are affected less
by the thread of nullification of the patent. Regarding hypothesis 7, consid-
ering the effect of in-trial invalidation of the disputed patent I do not find
that a (partial) invalidation of the disputed patent during the infringement
proceedings significantly affects the performance of the plaintiff. This result
may however be due to the fact that there are only 3 observations with an
invalidation during trial.
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Table 9: Interaction of the treatment effect with firm and trial-specific characteristics- Plaintiffis
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Plaintiff −8.650∗∗∗ (3.057) −10.316∗∗ (5.001) −28.212∗ (14.506)
Plaintiff*Settle (baseline: Loss) 0.199 (5.248) −0.021 (5.260)
Plaintiff*Win (baseline: Loss) 4.395 (5.694) 3.776 (5.595)
Plaintiff*Partial Win (baseline: Loss) 7.238 (8.554) 7.870 (8.820)
Repeat litigant 1.225 (5.236)
Number of Plaintiff firms 13.823 (11.998)
Plaintiff simple licensee −10.704∗∗ (4.863)
Value at stake/turnover −0.043 (0.160)
Patent invalidated 24.260 (28.342)
Plaintiff*Ln(L2.employees) 1.022 (1.351)
Ln(L2.employees) −0.771 (1.173) −0.744 (1.175) −1.391 (1.530)
Patent stock/L2.employees 0.082 (0.081) 0.088 (0.082) 0.087 (0.088)
L2.Credit rating −0.048 (0.048) −0.049 (0.049) −0.048 (0.048)
EP dummy −10.466 (12.113) −11.089 (12.204) −10.801 (12.290)
Share_ElectricalEng 13.283 (13.037) 13.651 (13.086) 13.565 (13.060)
Share_Instruments 1.451 (11.945) 1.951 (12.002) 1.280 (11.925)
Share_Chemistry −3.273 (12.723) −3.198 (12.760) −2.880 (12.716)
Share_ProcessEng 5.336 (10.326) 6.124 (10.405) 6.041 (10.362)
Share_MechanicalEng −2.095 (11.134) −1.984 (11.166) −2.206 (11.085)
Share_Consumption 11.854 (10.357) 12.444 (10.482) 12.134 (10.392)
Age 0.082 (0.052) 0.082 (0.051) 0.078 (0.051)
Duration 6.993∗∗∗ (2.335) 7.010∗∗∗ (2.339) 6.851∗∗∗ (2.421)
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Legal form dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Constant 22.482 (16.185) 21.748 (16.411) 22.781 (16.855)
Constant 22.482 (1.39) 21.748 (1.33) 22.781 (1.35)
Observations 1194 1194 1194
R2 0.118 0.118 0.122
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
4.7 Robustness Checks
Though the observed change of the credit rating is a clear signal of or a positive
a negative impact of litigation, it is rather difficult to grasp how severe the
effect really is and to which degree firms are hurt or profit from litigation.
Therefore I now apply a different measure to capture the effect of litigation.
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I define a bankruptcy event as the firm going bancrupt sometime in between
the filing of the court case and at the latest 1 year after the end of trial.
This measure is based on the exit information in the Creditreform data that
indicates whether and when a firm exits for bankruptcy reasons. Using the
dummy variable bankruptcy event as dependent variable I estimate two probit
models of bankruptcy. I use the same structure as above and again cluster the
standard errors at the firm level. The results are displayed as average marginal
effects.
4.7.1 Defendants
The probabiliy of bankruptcy within the period of trial plus 1 year after the
end of trial is 3.9 percent for the control group and 4.2 percent for the defen-
dants. This difference is not significantly different from zero. Table 10 displays
the estimation results for the defendants 9 . Overall the effects reflect the pre-
vious results obtained when using the change in rating as dependent variable.
The average effect of being defendant in litigation is not significantly different
from zero, but the bankruptcy probability significantly increases with the de-
fendant losing or settling in trial compared to winning. Additionally, smaller
litigants and those with a high value at stake relatively to their turnover are
more likely to experience bankruptcy from trial. The bankruptcy probabil-
ity decreases with multiple defendants involved in trial. These results suggest
that litigation does have visible effects on the involved defendants that can go
beyond the (maybe rarely visible) change in credit rating.
4.7.2 Plaintiffs
The probabiliy of bankruptcy within the period of trial plus 1 year after the
end of trial is 4.4 percent for the control group and 2.3 percent for the plain-
tiffs. This difference is significantly different from zero, indicating that, again,
the treatment effect of litigation on plaintiffs is on average positive. Table 11
displays the estimation results for plaintiffs. I find that plaintiffs on average
profit from litigation as indicated by a lower bankruptcy probability. This
effect increases even more if the plaintiff wins in trial or agress upon a set-
9 The number of observations reduces as bankruptcy is a rather rare event and does
not happen in each of the industry classes.
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tlement deal compared to losing. This is the first time I can actually identify
an effect of the outcome of trial for the plaintiffs. The direction of the effect
is as expected. Similar to the defendants I also find small firms involved in
litigation be be more likely to go bankrupt than larger litigants. The effects
of the number of fellow plaintiffs, the plaintiffs relation to the disputed patent
and the relative value of the case to the plaintiff are opposite to what I would
expect. The bankruptcy probability significantly increases with the number of
plaintiffs and the plaintiff being a licensee rather than the patentowner. At the
same time the bankruptcy probability significantly reduces with an increase
of the relative value of the case to the plaintiff. One explanation for this might
be that these parties take more caution because they are particularly aware of
potential negative effects from invalidation. The effect of an invalidation of the
disputed patent during trial cannot be analyzed as none of the invalidations
leads to a bankruptcy event such that the variable has to be ommited in the
estimation 10 .
10Note that the variable partial win is also ommited as none of the plaintiffs with a
partial win go bancrupt
33
Table 10: Probability of bankruptcy- Defendants
(1) (2) (3)
Marg. effect Std. Err. Marg. effect Std. Err. Marg. effect Std. Err.
Defendant 0.002 (0.009) −0.050∗ (0.028) −0.044 (0.032)
Defendant*Loss (baseline: Win) 0.059∗∗ (0.029) 0.098∗∗∗ (0.031)
Defendant*Settle (baseline: Win) 0.055∗ (0.028) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.030)
Defendant*Partial Loss (baseline: Win) 0.071∗∗ (0.033) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.035)
Repeat litigant −0.035 (0.033)
Number defendant firms −0.013∗∗ (0.006)
Value at stake/turnover 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
Defendant trader −0.022 (0.015)
Defendant*Ln(L2.employees) −0.005 (0.004)
L2 Credit Rating 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Share_ElectricalEng 0.022 (0.034) 0.024 (0.034) 0.022 (0.034)
Share_Instruments 0.002 (0.043) 0.006 (0.043) 0.004 (0.041)
Share_Chemistry −0.058 (0.037) −0.057 (0.037) −0.056 (0.035)
Share_ProcessEng 0.010 (0.032) 0.015 (0.033) 0.017 (0.033)
Share_MechanicalEng 0.027 (0.035) 0.028 (0.035) 0.027 (0.035)
Share_Consumption −0.036 (0.045) −0.034 (0.045) −0.037 (0.044)
Patent stock/L2.employees −0.077∗ (0.044) −0.086∗ (0.050) −0.064∗∗∗ (0.017)
EP dummy −0.029 (0.033) −0.033 (0.034) −0.033 (0.034)
Age 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Duration 0.009∗∗ (0.004) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.004)
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Legal form dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 1638 1638 1629
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 11: Probability of bankruptcy- Plaintiffs
(1) (2) (3)
Marg. effect Std. Err. Marg. effect Std. Err. Marg. effect Std. Err.
Plaintiff −0.020∗∗ (0.010) 0.005 (0.016) 0.019 (0.029)
Plaintiff*Settle (baseline: Loss) −0.035∗ (0.019) −0.037∗∗ (0.019)
Plaintiff*Win (baseline: Loss) −0.042∗ (0.025) −0.056∗ (0.029)
Repest litigant −0.001 (0.025)
Number of Plaintiff firms 0.037 (0.024)
Plaintiff simple licensee 0.056∗ (0.030)
Value at stake/turnover −0.431∗∗ (0.189)
Plaintiff*Ln(L2.employees) −0.011∗ (0.006)
Ln(L2.employees) −0.005 (0.004) −0.004 (0.005) −0.004 (0.005)
Patent stock/L2.employees −0.019 (0.016) −0.024 (0.022) −0.034 (0.040)
L2.Credit Rating 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
EP dummy −0.066∗∗ (0.028) −0.064∗∗ (0.031) −0.067∗∗ (0.033)
Share_ElectricalEng 0.070∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.069∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.029)
Share_Instruments 0.075∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.070∗∗ (0.028) 0.092∗∗∗ (0.033)
Share_Chemistry −0.421∗∗ (0.188) −0.445∗∗ (0.174) −0.361∗ (0.186)
Share_ProcessEng −0.043 (0.033) −0.046 (0.035) −0.026 (0.033)
Share_MechanicalEng 0.062∗∗ (0.025) 0.053∗∗ (0.026) 0.067∗∗ (0.028)
Share_Consumption 0.054∗ (0.029) 0.050 (0.033) 0.044 (0.032)
Age 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Duration 0.013∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.018∗∗ (0.007)
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Legal form dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 878 806 804
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to derive predictions on the effect of patent lit-
igation on the firm performance of plaintiff and defendant and to emprically
test these by estimating treatment effects of patent litigation.
The results suggest that patent litigation in Germany constitutes a severe
threat for alleged infringers. Not only losing a case but also reaching a set-
tlement agreement has a negative impact on the defendant. This might be
explainable by a high bargaining power of the plaintiff that can force defen-
dants into settlement: Either plaintiffs are to a large degree correct in their
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presumption of infringement and can demand high settlement amounts to
avoid an unfavorable judgment for the defendant or they have a systematic
strategic advantage over the defendants. The fact that small, first time de-
fendants are affected more severely by litigation than other firms implies that
they have more difficulties in coping with litigation, which can be attributed
to their ability to deal with economic and financial distress. With respect to
the plaintiffs I show that there seems to be no tax on innovation for the paten-
tee himself: Plaintiffs generally profit from litigation in terms of their credit
rating, independent of the outcome of trial.
In a robustness check I then estimate the probability of a bankruptcy event
in between the filing date of trial and one year after its closing date. The
effects remain robust for the defendants. The estimation for plaintiffs reveals,
as before, that plaintiffs on average profit from litigation. It does however ad-
ditionally show that a victory or a settlement deal has a positive effect for the
plaintiff compared to losing in trial, which could not be shown in the prior
analysis, but which matches the theoretical considerations.
The fact that I am only able to identify moderating and intensifying factors
for the group of plaintiffs in the robustness check using the bankruptcy event
rather than the credit rating as dependent variable may be due to several
reasons: One reason may be the positive signalling effect of litigation. Being
known to sue another firm for infringement can discourage others from enter-
ing into the market and improve the firm's position. Given that the rating of
a firm is only updated upon request it is possible that the rating increases in
expectation of a positive litigation outcome. A negative outcome has a com-
paratively little effect for plaintiffs as it does not involve the nullification of
the patent, this may then not be enough for a request for a new investigation
of the firm and a subsequent worsening of the rating. A bankruptcy event
however, the most severe consequence for the plaintiff, is in any case reported
in the data independent of a request and can thus be related to the trial out-
come according to my expectations.
Taking together the study highlights two aspects: Small and inexperienced
firms are at a disadvantage when trying to deal with alleged infringement.If
litigation is mainly the result of unintended infringement, as suggested by
Bessen and Meuer (2008) or plaintiffs' strategies of "being infringed" rather
than willful infringement policy makers may think about mechanisms of sup-
porting firms, particularly small and inexperienced firms, in avoiding litiga-
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tion. The so-called ex-post tax on innovation on these small firms is partic-
ularly severe as the innovativeness of SMEs is particularly important for the
performance of any economy. Suffering from litigation may hamper this inno-
vativeness both through immediate effects from business interruption as well
as impaired access to finance.
The second aspect concerns the bifurcated litigation proceedures in Germany.
My results nicely reveal the spatial and temporal separation of invalidity and
infringement decisions. This split is generally seen to favour plaintiffs/patentees
in an infringement action as they are not faced with the direct thread of an
invalidation of their patent. With nullity suits frequently being a defendant's
most important defense, but taking much longer than an infringement trial,
the patentee can expect to win the infringement trial prior to the ruling of the
nullity trial. This puts him in a strong position to negotiate a favorable settle-
ment deal. This can also explain the differences in results when comparing this
study to studies on the US system: Studies like Bessen and Meurer (2008b)
show the expected effect of litigation for plaintiffs to be negative, reflecting
the risk that the disputed patents gets invalidated during the infringement
proceedings, while I identify a positive realized effect of litigation, reflecting
the fact that in Germany patents rarely get invalidated during infringement
trials. Infringement judgments may of course later have to be reversed due
to invalidation. This produces lots of transaction and opportunity costs and
given that innovations are produced and marketed at a very high speed the
economic damage resulting from wrong judgments can be immense. A simulta-
neous decision of both validity and infringement would solve this incongruity
and deliver immediate and reliable judgments. This would of course be at the
cost of a longer overall duration of the trial. At this point patent quality comes
into play. The higher the quality of the patents issued by the patent office the
less likely an invalidation of the patent and the less needed an invalidation
suit in parallel to an infringement suit.
Of course there are also several shortcomings. Compared to stock market stud-
ies that can track developments in firm value for the exact filing date the in-
terval of 6 months in between the publishing of the updated ratings leads to
rather rough estimates of the impact of litigation. Also it is not possible to dis-
tinguish between wilful infringement, unintended infringement and plaintiffs'
strategies of being infringed.
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A Probit Models
Table A1: Probit Model Defendants
(1)
Coef. t-value
Ln(L2.employees) 0.038∗∗∗ (4.87)
L2.Credit Rating −0.001∗∗∗ (−4.22)
Patent stock/L2.employees 0.009∗∗∗ (2.75)
Share_ElectricalEng 0.138∗∗ (2.48)
Share_Instruments −0.035 (−0.47)
Share_Chemistry 0.064 (0.87)
Share_ProcessEng 0.027 (0.47)
Share_MechanicalEng −0.097∗ (−1.68)
Share_Consumption 0.205∗∗ (2.33)
Age −0.002∗∗∗ (−3.63)
Constant −1.772∗∗∗(−22.04)
Observations 37889
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A2: Probit Model Plaintiffs
(1)
Coef. t-value
Ln(L2.employees) 0.046∗∗∗ (4.36)
L2.Credit Rating −0.001∗∗ (−2.57)
Patent stock/L2.employees 0.008∗∗ (2.56)
Share_ElectricalEng 0.086 (1.49)
Share_Instruments −0.039 (−0.52)
Share_Chemistry −0.122 (−1.39)
Share_ProcessEng −0.015 (−0.27)
Share_MechanicalEng −0.111∗ (−1.89)
Share_Consumption 0.296∗∗∗ (3.92)
Age 0.000 (1.16)
Constant −1.895∗∗∗(−18.53)
Observations 21954
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B Flowchart Proceedings
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C An Example of a Litigation Case
As an example of a litigation suit consider the case heard at the district
court of Düsseldorf with case number 4b O 479/03. The case has been filed
by BSH Bosch Siemens Hausgeräte GmbH on January 5th 2004 against the
Italy-based firm Merloni Elettrodomestici regarding the Patent EP 92113435
titled "Refrigeration apparatus, especially refrigerator or freezer". Merloni
Elettrodomestici sells refrigerators in Germany through its German subsidiary.
BSH Bosch Siemens Hausgeräte accuses the defendant of the infringement of
its patent on refrigerators and files for omission of infringement as well as
damages. The defendant files for the dismissal of the case and parallely files a
nullity suit at the Federal Patent Court in Munich on May 10th 2004. It re-
quests a stay of the proceedings until a decision on validity has been rendered.
Based on a low probability of success of the invalidity suit the Düsseldorf court
refuses a stay of proceedings and judges on September 16th 2004 that infringe-
ment took place. The defendant is ordered to omit further infringement, to
disclose exact numbers on produced refrigerators based on the disputed patent
and to pay damages according to these numbers. The value at stake in this
case was 500000 Euros resulting in a cost risk (court plus lawyer costs) of
about 40000 Euros. The decision on validity is rendered only on the 3rd of
May 2005, almost 9 months after the judgment on infringement: The court
does not invalidate the patent 11 .
D Empirical Methodology
Given the theoretical considerations and the advantages of using changes in
credit rating data as a proxy for changes in firm value, the idea of the empirical
approach is to analyze the impact of being involved in patent litigation on the
credit rating of the firm. The impact of being involved in litigation on the
rating of a firm can be calculated as follows:
αTT = E
(
Y T |L = 1
)
− E
(
Y C |L = 1
)
, (D.1)
11 Source: Own data collected at Düsseldorf court
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with Y T denoting the rating of a firm having been involved in litigation and
Y C denoting the rating of the firm in case of not having been involved in
litigation. Variable L stands for the treatment status being 1 if the firm has
received a treatment (litigation) and 0 otherwise. The average treatment effect
on the treated αTT thus results from comparing the rating of a firm involved
in litigation to its (hypothetical) rating in case of not being involved in lit-
igation. While the first term in equation 1 can easily be calculated by the
sample mean of the rating of the treated firms the so-called counterfactual
situation has to be estimated. While it is tempting to simply calculate the
average rating of the firms not involved in litigation and subtract this from
the average rating of the treated firms to obtain the average treatment effect
on the treated, this can lead to a severe bias in the results. It is quite pos-
sible that the firms involved in litigation would have a different rating than
the non-litigating firms even if they were not involved in litigation. This is
because certain firms are more likely to be affected by patent litigation than
others: different R&D expenditures, differences in industry and size can result
in an overall different condition of the firms. As factors affecting the litigation
probability are at the same time affecting the future firm value, the treatment
(being involved in litigation) is an endogenous variable in the estimation of
firm value. The econometric literature on treatment effects suggests a num-
ber of methods that can be applied to control for this endogeneity problem.
For a survey of the methods refer to Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009). Possible
methods include instrumental variable estimations, selection models as well as
matching estimators and difference-in-difference estimations. As instrumental
variable and selection models require valid instruments for the treatment that
are uncorrlated with the outcome variable and it is difficult to find such vari-
ables in the context of firm value and litigation, I will apply the conditional
difference-in-difference estimator, a mixture of the matching method and the
difference in difference estimator, in this paper.
The matching estimator is a non-parametric estimator to identify the treat-
ment effect. It is aimed at finding a twin firm for each treated firm that matches
with respect to a set of observable characteristics X that affects the selection
into treatment, but does not receive the treatment. The difference in rating
between the treatment group and the matched group of twin firms can then
be attributed to the treatment. Rubin (1977) has introduced the conditional
independence assumption that states that treatment and the rating outcome
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are independent for firms with the same exogenous characteristics X. Given
that X contains all relevant variables that determine the treatment as well as
the outcome, the counterfactual situation can be estimated by
E
(
Y C |L = 1, X = x
)
= E
(
Y C |L = 0, X = x
)
. (D.2)
The average treatment effect on the treatment can then be estimated as
αMTT = E
(
Y T |L = 1, X = x
)
− E
(
Y C |L = 0, X = x
)
, (D.3)
given that the sample of non-treated firms offers a counterpart to each treated
firm.
As the vector of observable characteristics X can contain numerous variables
it becomes difficult to find non-treated firms that exactly match with respect
to these characteristics ("curse of dimensionality"). In order to overcome this,
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that the vector of observable char-
acteristics can be reduced to a single index, the propensity score, which is
the estimated probability of receiving a treatment. The matching can then be
applied to this composite index. This methodology is called propensity score
matching and I chose to conduct nearest neighbor matching, which keeps for
each treated firm only the most similar control observation. It is possible to
impose further restrictions on the control group, and I impose industry, a
broad firm size category, a patent dummy and firm legal form dummies to
match between the treated fims and their control firm.
While the advantage of the matching estimator is that it requires no functional
form assumptions about the outcome equation, the disadvantage is that it
controls only for observable differences between the treatment and the control
group. Therefore I combine the matching estimator with a difference in dif-
ference estimator. The DiD estimator requires a panel database as it is based
on estimating the counterfactual situation as the outcome of the treated firm
in a period prior to the treatment. It is estimated as the difference between
the outcome of the treated firm after the treatment and the outcome of the
treated firm prior to its treatment. In order to control for general macroe-
conomic changes a second difference is calculated between the outcome of a
non-treated control sample observed for the same time period. The DiD esti-
mator is then calculated as the double difference:
αDiDTT = E
(
Y T1 − Y T0 |L = 1
)
− E
(
Y C1 − Y C0 |L = 0
)
. (D.4)
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The advantages of the DiD approach are straightforward: both common macroe-
conomic trends and constant individual-specific unobserved effects can be con-
trolled for. The conditional DiD estimator now combines the advantages of the
matching estimator with the advantages of the DiD estimator. By chosing the
control group of the DiD based on a matching approach that ensures the
treated and the control firms to match on the set of observables X, common
macroeconomic trends, constant individual-specific unobserved effects as well
as observable differences between the groups can be controlled for (Heckman
et al. 1998). It is estimated by
αCDiDTT = E
(
Y T1 − Y T0 |L = 1, X = x
)
−E
(
Y C1 − Y C0 |L = 0, X = x
)
.(D.5)
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